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NOTES
COSTELLO v. STA UBITZ: THE STATUS OF THE
VISIBLE LINE OF DEMARCATION IN
ADVERSE POSSESSION IN
MARYLAND
[W]e do not need the wall:
He is all pine and I am apple orchard.
My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says, "Good fences make good neighbors."'
Adverse possession is the means of acquiring title to property by posses-
sion of the property for the duration of the statutory period for bringing an
action for its recovery.2 Subject to certain additional requirements,3 such
1. R. FROST, Mending Wall, THE POCKET BOOK OF ROBERT FROST'S POEMS 94 (1971).
2. 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1012[2][a] (1984). The concept that
adverse possession is a limitation of rights, rather than a presumption of deed or ouster, was
recognized early by Maryland courts. See Hammond v. Ridgely's Lessee, 5 H. & J. 245
(1821).
The limitations period for real property in Maryland is twenty years. MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 4-103 (1984). The origin of this statute is Limitations Act 21, Jac., ch. 16
(1623), which was in effect in 1776, the year Maryland incorporated English statutory law into
its jurisprudence. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Marburg, I10 Md. 410, 414, 72 A. 839, 841
(1909). The statute in effect when Costello v. Staubitz, 300 Md. 60, 475 A.2d 1185 (1984), was
filed provided as follows: "Within 20 years from the date the cause of action accrues, a person
shall: (1) File an action for recovery of possession of a corporeal freehold or leasehold estate in
land; or (2) Enter on the land." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-103 (1980), reprinted
in Costello, 300 Md. at 67 n.2, 475 A.2d at 1188 n.2.
3. In Maryland, to be adverse, possession of real property must be actual, hostile, open,
notorious, exclusive, under claim of title or ownership, continuous, and uninterrupted. See,
e.g., Blickenstaff v. Bromley, 243 Md. 164, 220 A.2d 558 (1966). All these elements coalesce
into the requirement that the adverse claimant act as if he intended to claim the property as his
own. See Waltemeyer v. Baughman, 63 Md. 200, 204 (1884) (the adverse claimant's acts must
have indicated that the possession was a claim of title). For example, possession is "actual" if
it is accompanied by such acts of ownership that would be evidence of a claim of ownership.
Gee v. Ghee, 194 Md. 328, 332, 70 A.2d 810, 811 (1950). Such acts of ownership can differ
from case to case, depending upon the character and location of the property. Blickenstaff,
243 Md. at 171, 220 A.2d at 561. Similarly, "hostility" does not denote enmity or ill will but
rather such possession that manifests an intent to claim the property without recognition of the
legal owner's right to the land. Hungerford v. Hungerford, 234 Md. 338, 340, 199 A.2d 209,
211 (1964). Maryland courts construe "exclusive" to denote such dominion over the property
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possession vests title in the adverse claimant by operation of law and without
the consent of the true owner.4 Indeed, the adverse possession generally
rests on trespass. 5
In Costello v. Staubitz,6 the Maryland Court of Appeals7 held that a visi-
ble line of demarcation, a fence that was erected by the record land owner's
predecessor in title for his own purposes, was not evidence that would sup-
port a rival claim of adverse possession. Therefore, the court ruled that the
adverse claimant could take title only to the property he actually occupied,
rather than to the property delineated by the fence.
Maryland adverse possession cases have frequently involved visible lines
of demarcation, such as fences or roads, that owners of contiguous property
as will constitute an appropriation of it for the possessor's use and benefit. Blickenstaff, 243
Md. at 173, 220 A2d at 562. Moreover, the adverse claimant's possession is abandoned if he
ceases to perform acts of ownership on the property, even if he continues to pay taxes on it.
Goen v. Sansbury, 219 Md. 289, 149 A.3d 17 (1959).
4. 5 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 2540 (1979); see Armstrong v. Risteau's Lessee, 5 Md. 256 (1853) (adverse possession will
support an ejectment action against the legal owner); Casey's Lessee v. Inloes, 1 Gill 430, 490
(1844) (title by possession will repair defect in chain of title); Regents of Univ. of Md. v.
Trustees of Cavalry M.E. Church S., 104 Md. 635, 65 A. 398 (1906) (although church's deed
was void, it had title by adverse possession and therefore a subsequent sale was valid); see also
Mills v. Trustees of Zion Chapel, 119 Md. 510, 87 A. 257 (1913). But see Hungerford, 234 Md.
at 340-41, 199 A.2d at 211 (the absence of hostility prevents adverse possession from resulting
when a conveyance violates the statute of frauds unless the record owner has notice of claim-
ant's claim to title).
5. 5 G. THOMPSON, supra note 4, at § 2540. Thompson consequently described adverse
possession as "the law of the landless, the have nots." Id. Another commentator took a less
sympathetic view of title by adverse possession. See Stoebuck, The Law of Adverse Possession
in Washington, 35 WASH. L. REV. 53, 53 (1960) (adverse possession is a "strange and drastic
doctrine" by which "a legal right is obtained through conduct which must be wrongful").
Commentators have suggested various policy justifications for the doctrine of adverse pos-
session. These justifications include: to encourage the development of land by facilitating the
conveyance of titles and by protecting the utilization of vacant land, to quiet titles by minimiz-
ing the assertion of stale claims, to protect third persons who act in reliance on the possessor's
claim of title, to correct conveyancing errors, and to punish property owners who fail to assert
their titles within a reasonable time. See generally C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION 89-
96 (1961); Stoebuck, supra, at 53; Williams, Title by Adverse Possession in Indiana, 6 VAL. U.L.
REV. 26, 29 (1971). The introductory clause to the English precursor of the Maryland statute
of limitations provided that its purpose was "for quieting of men's estates, and avoiding of
suits." Limitations Act, 21 Jac., ch. 16 (1623). Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested that there
was a more elemental reason for the doctrine: "The true explanation of title by prescription
[is] that man, like a tree cleft of a rock, gradually shapes his roots to his surroundings, and
when the roots have grown to a certain size, cannot be displaced without cutting at his life."
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to William James (April 1, 1907), reprinted in P. GOLD-
STEIN, REAL PROPERTY 25 (1984).
6. 300 Md. 60, 475 A.2d 1185 (1984).
7. The Court of Appeals is the highest court in Maryland. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 1-301 (1984).
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erroneously believed to be their boundary. Thus, Maryland courts have de-
veloped a body of law regarding the effect of these visible lines of demarca-
tion in adverse possession cases. This Note will trace the development of
this body of law. It will then demonstrate how Costello v. Staubitz synthe-
sized the earlier cases and produced a rule that, through its clarity and ease
of application, should simplify litigation in the adverse possession area.
I. VISIBLE LINES OF DEMARCATION IN ADVERSE POSSESSION-
ENCLOSURES
A. Pre Act of 1852
Enclosure of the claimed property by the adverse claimant for the twenty-
year limitations period was a requirement in the early development of the
doctrine of adverse possession.8 Thus, in Cheney v. Ringgold9 the court held
that the legal owner of a tract of land could proceed in ejectment against the
adverse claimant as to the unenclosed portion of the tract, notwithstanding
that the adverse claimant had used and enjoyed that portion for cutting tim-
ber for over twenty years."° The legal owner, however, was barred with re-
spect to the portion that the claimant had enclosed twenty-seven years
before the legal owner brought suit."
8. This rule was announced by the Maryland General Court in Davidson's Lessee v.
Beatty, 3 H. & McH. 594 (1797). The court also noted that a possessor of a tract of land with
title had possession of the whole unless excluded by the rival claimant's enclosures. Id. at 621.
See also Gibson v. Martin, 1 H. & J. 545 (1805). One court, however, construed the enclosure
rule too strictly and ruled that the removal of enclosures, although only temporary while en-
larging the fences, defeated a claim of adverse possession. This unreported ruling was summa-
rily reversed on appeal in Hall v. Gittings' Lessee, 2 H. & J. 380, 395 (1809). See also
Morrison v. Hammond's Lessee, 27 Md. 604, 618-19 (1867) (temporary breaches of the enclo-
sure do not defeat an adverse possession claim).
9. 2 H. & J. 87 (1807).
10. Id. at 95.
11. Id. Cheney involved "mixed possession"; i.e., both the legal owner and the adverse
claimant had possession by enclosure of portions of the tract. Both parties had enjoyed the
property exterior to the enclosures by sparsim cutting and general user. The legal owner did
not have to prove enclosure of the entire tract because he had legal title to the whole. Id. at 94.
The Cheney court expressly did not reach the question of whether enclosure was a requirement
of adverse possession in cases where the legal owner did not have possession, despite the "con-
siderable importance" of that issue. Id. at 93. The modern mind has difficulty comprehending
the importance of this issue because it is now clear that title vests in the legal owner whether or
not he is in possession of the property. This was not clear in early Maryland jurisprudence,
however, perhaps resulting from the lingering influence of the medieval concept of seisin. See
infra note 12. Thus, in Hoye v. Swan, 5 Md. 237 (1853) the adverse claimant of an unenclosed
tract argued that enclosure was unnecessary because the legal owner did not have possession of
the tract. Id. at 241-42. After a careful analysis that underscored the importance of the issue,
the court rejected this argument on the ground that if presumptions were to be made, they
should be made in favor of the legal owner rather than a tortfeasor, id. at 255, and held that
1986] 1023
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The rationale for the enclosure rule was threefold. First, enclosure was
evidence that the adverse claimant was seized of the claimed tract. 12 Sec-
ond, requiring enclosure made the acquisition of real property by adverse
possession more difficult, thereby protecting the rightful owner's title. 3
Third, the erection of enclosures was an act of ownership that helped prove
the adversary nature of the possession. 14
whether the possession was mixed or unmixed was immaterial. Id. at 248. Therefore, the
claim of adverse possession failed. Id. at 255-56.
12. Seisin, the concept underlying the system of medieval rights and duties with respect to
land, simply denoted possession. II F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 31 (1895). Etymologically the term reduces to "to sit." Id. at 29. Title, or ownership,
derived from seisin: "every title to land ha[d] its root in seisin; the title which ha[d] its root in
the oldest seisin [was] the best title." Id. at 46. The early Maryland cases implicitly recog-
nized this concept and struggled to apportion value to one person's seisin of a tract vis-a-vis
another person's title to the same tract. For example, in Cheney, 2 H. & J. at 93, the court
confined its holding to the rule that enclosure was required in adverse possession when both
adverse claimant and title holder possessed portions of the tract. That the court did not imme-
diately quash the suggestion that adverse possession should be easier to prove (i.e., eliminate
the enclosure rule) if the legal owner was not in possession illustrated the willingness of the
early courts to protect possession over title. See II F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra, at 40-
43 (discussing the reasons that English law protected possession-"something that will from
time to time come into sharp collision with ownership").
Not until 1853, in Hoye, did Maryland courts establish that adverse possessors were
tortfeasors whose actions were protected not because of the sanctity of possession but for pol-
icy reasons: "that disputes in regard to titles and boundaries should not be encouraged or
revived after the lapse of many years." 5 Md. at 255. Indeed, the court explicitly noted that
this policy was not in conformity with justice. Id.
This early emphasis on seisin also suggests why the enclosure had to enclose the claimed
property completely. See Casey's Lessee v. Inloes, 1 Gill 430 (1844); Armstrong, 5 Md. at 273.
Enclosure was the best proof of seisin; without color of title, all the adverse claimant had was
his fences to prove the extent of his occupation. Moreover, enclosure put the legal owner on
notice that he was deseized of his land. See id. at 278. Not until 1868, well after the Act of
1852, did Newman v. Young, 30 Md. 417 (1868), suggest that a natural boundary, the Poto-
mac River, could complete an enclosure.
13. See Davidson's Lessee, 3 H. & McH. at 621 (the rightful owner of land is favored over
the intruder or trespasser); Gwynn v. Jones' Lessee, 2 G. & J. 173, 184 (1830) ("nothing is to
be presumed in favor of an adverse possession"); Hoye, 5 Md. at 255 (presumptions are not
made in favor of a tortfeasor); see also Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61
WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 332 (1983) (arguing that modern courts implicitly favor innocent trespass-
ers over knowing trespassers in adverse possession).
14. In Davidson's Lessee, 3 H. & McH. at 621-22, the court reasoned that enclosure was
an act of ownership that unequivocally showed a claim of title adverse to the rightful owner
and excluded the legal owner from the use and enjoyment of the property. Similarly, the court
in Hammond v. Warfield, 2 H. & J. 151, 158 (1807), held that possession was adverse only if
the claimed tract was enclosed. Moreover, the court in Gwynn, 2 G. & J. at 184, held that
enclosures erected by tenants for reasons of utility rather than to claim title did not show the
necessary hostility to take the land by adverse possession even though the tenant remained on
the land past the term of the lease. But see Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Marbury, 110 Md. 410,
72 A. 839 (1909) (the Gwynn result statutorily changed; landlord loses fee if he does not claim
rental for 20 years). In Cresap's Lessee v. Hutson, 9 Gill 269, 278 (1850), the court reasoned
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B. Post Act of 1852
In 1852, the Maryland legislature eliminated the requirement of enclosure
of the property claimed by the adverse claimant. 5 The statute, however, did
not entirely negate the impact of enclosure upon adverse possession. Rather,
enclosure continued to be evidence of acts of ownership reflecting the adver-
sary nature of the possession and showing that the claimant was making a
claim against the legal owner's title. In Storr v. James 6 the court held that
an enclosure, when erected by the adverse claimant or his privy, constituted
evidence of the "character" of the claim. 7 The court explained that, as the
claimant's "own affirmative act,"' 8 the enclosure defined the extent of the
claim.' 9 Yet, as was the case in Storr, when someone other than the adverse
claimant erected the enclosure, the enclosure had no reference to the claim
and could not constitute evidence of the adverse possession.2°
The Storr holding was applied in Mauck v. Bailey,2 ' where the court held
that because a fence was erected and maintained by an adverse claimant, it
constituted evidence of the adverse possession claim.22 On the other hand,
that an enclosure delineating an incorrect boundary could not support an adverse possession
claim because the claimant did not hold the property adversely to his neighbor. But see infra
notes 25-29 and accompanying text. The court in Armstrong, 5 Md. at 278, held that a fence
did not evidence an adverse possession claim when erected by someone other than the claimant
because it did not show the claimant's intent to claim the property. The court also noted that
to hold otherwise would put a land owner at risk of losing his property to adverse claimants
when the legal owner enclosed portions of his tract without "abandoning his title to what may
be left out." Id. The court further noted that the fence at issue in Casey's Lessee, 1 Gill at 430,
a mere single line, more effectively manifested a claim of ownership than the fence at issue in
Armstrong because the former was clearly a "possession fence." Armstrong, 5 Md. at 278.
15. The legislation provided that "actual enclosure shall not be necessary to prove posses-
sion, but acts of use and ownership other than enclosure, may be given in evidence to the jury
to prove possession." Act of 1852, ch. 177, § 2, reprinted in Thistle v. Frostburg Coal Co., 10
Md. 129, 144 (1856). The Thistle court noted that to apply the Act retroactively would imper-
missibly take the property from the legal owner, who had acted in reliance on the enclosure
rule, and give it to the adverse claimant. Id. at 144-45. The court also noted that to give the
Act a liberal construction would be a contravention of common law, and required that posses-
sion claimed under it be shown with "clearness and precision." Id. at 146-47. The adverse
claimant in Thistle failed to make this showing. But see Warner v. Hardy, 6 Md. 525, 539
(1854) (affirming lower court's rejection of the legal owner's proffer of evidence that the
claimed property was not enclosed for 20 years).
16. 84 Md. 282, 35 A. 965 (1896).
17. Id. at 291, 35 A. at 967. Thus the court continued to recognize the third rationale for
the enclosure rule. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
18. Id. See also Matthews v. Ward, 10 G. & J. 443, 457 (1839) (adverse claimant must
show he committed some "positive act;" mere nonrecognition of the legal owner's rights was
insufficient).
19. 84 Md. at 291, 25 A. at 967.
20. Id.
21. 247 Md. 434, 231 A.2d 685 (1967).
22. Id. at 442, 231 A.2d at 690.
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in Stinchcomb v. Realty Mortgage Co., 23 the court held that a fence did not
demonstrate that the adverse claimant was making a claim against the legal
owner's title because, inter alia, it was erected to restrain livestock rather
than to delineate a boundary. Therefore, the fence could not be evidence of
the adverse possession.24
The Storr holding was extended in Jacobs v. Disharoon 25 to situations in
which the claimant mistakenly erected an enclosure on property contiguous
to his land. The court distinguished two situations: first, where the adverse
claimant erected the fence with the intent, albeit mistaken, of marking the
boundary; and second, where the adverse claimant erected the fence to mark
merely provisional boundaries. In the first situation, the statute of limita-
tions ran because the claimant was asserting a claim against the legal
owner's title. In the second situation, the statute did not run because the
adverse claimant was not asserting such a claim.
2 6
This rule was extended in Tamburo v. Miller,27 where the court held that
whether the adverse claimant mistakenly possessed the property was imma-
terial so long as he proved "unequivocal acts of ownership" over the en-
closed tract.28 The court reasoned that such objective acts of ownership
were sufficient to prove his intent to claim the enclosed property. 29 The
Tamburo rule was subsequently applied to cases in which someone other
than the adverse claimant erected the fence. For example, in Ridgely v.
Lewis,' 0 the court held that a fence surrounding a parcel that encompassed
the disputed area was evidence supporting the adverse claim. Although
there was no evidence as to who erected the fence or the purpose for its
erection, the court held that the adverse claimants had performed sufficient
acts of ownership by farming the disputed tract to take title to it.31 Simi-
larly, in Wilt v. Wilt, 32 where the adverse claimants' predecessor in title con-
structed a fence to serve as a boundary, the adverse possession claim
23. 171 Md. 317, 188 A. 790 (1937).
24. Id. at 320-21, 188 A. at 793.
25. 113 Md. 92, 77 A. 258 (1910).
26. Id. at 98, 77 A. at 260. This holding implicitly overruled several cases with respect to
the mistake issue, including Cresap's Lessee, 9 Gill 269 (1850) and Davis v. Furlow's Lessees,
27 Md. 536 (1867). The court in each of these cases equated the adverse claimant's mistake as
to the boundary with a lack of intent to claim title to the property, which meant that the
hostility element was missing. See Cresap's Lessee, 9 Gill at 278; Davis, 27 Md. at 545.
27. 203 Md. 329, 100 A.2d 818 (1953).
28. Id. at 336, 100 A.2d at 821.
29. Id. at 337, 100 A.2d at 821-22. The acts were erection of a barbed wire fence, cultiva-
tion of a hedge, and construction of a boathouse. Id. at 337, 100 A.2d at 822.
30. 204 Md. 563, 105 A.2d 212 (1954).
31. Id. at 567, 105 A.2d at 213-14. See Costello, 300 Md. at 72, 475 A.2d at 1190.
32. 242 Md. 129, 218 A.2d 180 (1966).
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succeeded when it was discovered that the fence did not mark the true
boundary. Again, the dispositive consideration was the adverse claimants'
acts of ownership, i.e., farming that extended up to the fence line.
33
In summation, Maryland courts have consistently recognized the eviden-
tiary value of fences in adverse possession cases-that their erection was an
"act of ownership" that the adverse claimant could proffer to show that he
claimed the delineated tract. Moreover, when the courts have found that the
adverse claimant has performed other acts of ownership, as they did in
Ridgely, Wilt, and Brooke, the issue of who erected the fence was rendered
effectively irrelevant. Even when visible lines of demarcation other than
fences have been involved, the courts have undertaken similar analyses.
II. VISIBLE LINES OF DEMARCATION OTHER THAN FENCES
Maryland courts have occasionally decided adverse possession cases in-
volving visible lines of demarcation other than fences, such as roads or
ditches. The first such case was Newman v. Young,34 which suggested that a
river could complete an enclosure of a tract of land partially bounded by
fences.3 5 More recently, the court in Tamburo3 6 did not confine its holding
to fences, stating that the adverse claim would succeed if the claimant per-
formed unequivocal acts of ownership and "visible boundaries have existed
for" the statutory period.3 7 In one of Tamburo's progeny, Ervin v. Brown,38
the court held that the adverse claimant took title to property extending to a
hedge planted by the neighboring record owner inside of his true boundary
line.39 Obviously the hedge did not evidence acts of ownership performed by
the adverse claimant. In fact, a garden worked by the claimant's predeces-
sor, an act clearly suggesting ownership, extended only to an area about five
feet from the hedge.' Nevertheless, the court found it "reasonable to as-
sume" that the claimant's predecessor had occupied the strip of land be-
tween the garden and the hedge by walking on it while performing garden
33. Id. at 131-32, 218 A.2d at 181-82. The court noted that the claimants generally
treated the fence line as the boundary. Id. at 132, 218 A.2d at 181. Similarly, in East Wash-
ington Ry. v. Brooke, 244 Md. 287, 223 A.2d 599 (1966), the court was silent as to who
erected a fence that enclosed the contested strip into the claimant's tract. Nevertheless, the
court held that the claimant had acquired title to the strip by adverse possession because he
had farmed it. Id. at 295, 223 A.2d at 604.
34. 30 Md. 417 (1869).
35. Id. at 421. This case, although decided after the Act of 1852, applied the enclosure
rule.
36. 203 Md. 329, 100 A.2d 818 (1953). See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
37. 203 Md. at 336, 100 A.2d at 821 (emphasis added).
38. 204 Md. 136, 102 A.2d 806 (1954).
39. Id. at 139-40, 102 A.2d at 808.
40. Id. at 141. 102 A.2d at 809.
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chores. 4' The court also emphasized that the legal owner did not occupy
that strip.
42
Similarly, the court in Blickenstaff v. Bromley43 held that a road bisecting
the record owner's property became a "visible and fixed boundar[y]" that
separated the resulting sections, one of which was contiguous to the adverse
claimant's tract.4" The court emphasized the claimant's acts of ownership 45
but was unconcerned with whether those acts extended to the road. The
court also noted that the road contributed to the visibility of the adverse
possession 46 and noted, as in Ervin, that the record owner had abandoned
his possession.47 Finally, in Freed v. Cloverlea Citizens Association,48 the
court held that a ditch formed a boundary that defined an adverse possession
claim where the claimant performed acts of ownership on the tract so
delineated.49
Thus, as with fences, the effect of other visible lines of demarcation in
adverse possession cases was to provide evidence of the adverse claim. Be-
cause such visible lines of demarcation were not constructed by the adverse
claimant, however, they could not be evidence of the "character" of the
claim. Rather, these nonfence lines of demarcation evidenced the extent of
the claim if the claimant performed sufficient acts of ownership on the
claimed tract. The rule announced by Costello v. Staubitz was a synthesis of
these cases encompassing fence and nonfence visible lines of demarcation.5"
III. COSTELLO V. STAUBITZ: THE SYNTHESIS AND THE RULE
In Costello v. Staubitz,5' the Maryland Court of Appeals synthesized this
jurisprudence, relying principally on three cases, and announced a rule of
law broad enough to apply to virtually any adverse possession case involving
a visible line of demarcation. In Costello, a survey revealed that a barbed
wire fence, erected by the record owner's predecessor in title, was not situ-
41. Id. at 142, 102 A.2d at 809.
42. Id., 102 A.2d at 809.
43. 243 Md. 164, 220 A.2d 558 (1966).
44. Id. at 170, 220 A.2d at 561.
45. These acts included clearing brush, cutting timber, and cultivating a garden. Id. at
172, 220 A.2d at 562.
46. Id., 220 A.2d at 562.
47. Id. at 170, 220 A.2d at 561. Blickenstaff arose because a drought forced the record
owner to use a spring located on the disputed property. Id., 220 A.2d at 561.
48. 246 Md. 288, 228 A.2d 421 (1967).
49. Id. at 304, 228 A.2d at 431.
50. 300 Md. 60, 74, 475 A.2d 1185, 1192 (1984) (applying the principle that title acquired
by adverse possession shall extend only to the land actually occupied rather than to all the land
delineated by a visible boundary).
51. 300 Md. 60, 475 A.2d 1185 (1984).
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ated on the boundary between the record owner's lot and his neighbor's.
Rather, it ran diagonally to the true boundary, thereby forming two triangu-
lar pieces of property, one on the record owner's lot and the other on his
neighbor's lot.5 2 The neighbor brought suit to quiet title to the triangle lo-
cated on the record owner's property,53 arguing that he had acquired title to
it by adverse possession through acts of ownership extending to the fence.54
The trial court's opinion, which was not published but was quoted at
length by the court of appeals, held that the adverse claimant neighbor ac-
quired title to the property by adverse possession." The trial court noted
that it was uncontroverted that the fence had been erected to mark the
boundary between the two lots,56 and reasoned that the claimant's acts of
ownership made the possession actual.57
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported per
curiam opinion, which was also quoted extensively by the court of appeals.
58
The record owner argued that the rule of Storr v. James59 made irrelevant
the finding that the fence demarcated the boundary because the fence had
not been erected by the adverse claimant.60 The court rejected this argu-
ment, reasoning that although the erection of the fence could not be an act of
ownership, the fence was nonetheless a visible boundary that delineated the
extent of the claimant's possession.6' The court further held that under
Tamburo62 it was irrelevant that the boundary was incorrectly marked.
63
The court of appeals reversed and remanded. It deemed the trial court's
finding that the fence was erected as a boundary to be clearly erroneous. 64
52. Id. at 63, 475 A.2d at 1186.
53. Id., 475 A.2d at 1186. The triangle on the adverse claimant's lot was not in dispute.
Id., 475 A.2d at 1186. The triangle on the record owner's lot was river-front property, while
the triangle on the claimant's lot was road-front property. See id., 475 A.2d at 1186.
54. These acts included maintaining an "animal sanctuary," planting trees, constructing
a shed, a boat railway, and a portable firepit, extending his pier, and burying a pet. Id. at 64-
65, 475 A.2d at 1187. Additionally, several neighbors testified that they thought the claimant
owned the property. Id. at 64, 475 A.2d at 1187. That the acts extended beyond the statutory
period was not in dispute.
55. Id. at 66, 475 A.2d at 1188.
56. Id. at 65, 475 A.2d at 1187. The court of appeals, however, noted that the claimant
had testified that the "sole purpose" for erecting the fence was to confine cattle owned by the
record owner's predecessor in interest. Id. at 64, 475 A.2d at 1187. See infra note 65 and
accompanying text.
57. 300 Md. at 65, 475 A.2d at 1187.
58. Id. at 66, 475 A.2d at 1188.
59. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
60. 300 Md. at 66, 475 A.2d at 1188.
61. Id., 475 A.2d at 1188.
62. 203 Md. at 329, 100 A.2d at 818. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
63. 300 Md. at 74, 475 A.2d at 1192.
64. Id. at 73. 475 A.2d at 1191-92.
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Instead, it determined that the purpose of the fence was to restrain the live-
stock that belonged to the adverse claimant's predecessor in title.6" Relying
on Storr v. James, 66 it held that a fence, when erected by someone other than
the adverse claimant, did not constitute a boundary for the purpose of defin-
ing the extent of the adverse possession.67 Moreover, the court held that
under Tamburo the fence was not a boundary because the adverse claimant
had not erected it with the intent to delineate the claimed boundary.6" Fi-
nally, the court held that under Ridgely v. Lewis, 69 if there was no evidence
as to who erected the fence or the purpose for its erection, the fence could
still constitute evidence supporting the claim of adverse possession. 70 The
court determined, however, that the fence was constructed by a previous title
holder to serve as a cow fence and consequently, reasoned that the Ridgely
holding did not apply. Therefore, the court ruled that the possession could
extend only to property actually occupied by the adverse claimant and re-
manded for consideration of that issue.7 '
Thus, the rule handed down by Costello is that if the visible line of demar-
cation was not erected by the adverse claimant, the claimant can take title
only to the property that he actually occupied. On the other hand, if the
visible line of demarcation was erected by the adverse claimant for the pur-
pose of delineating the claimed parcel, or if there was no evidence of who
erected it or its purpose, the visible line of demarcation would constitute
evidence of adverse possession of all the property it defined. 72 The court
derived this rule by a synthesis of Storr, Tamburo, and Ridgely. Thus, the
court provided Maryland practitioners a rare "bright line" rule that should
ease future litigation in the adverse possession area, particularly with respect
to visible lines of demarcation.
65. Id., 475 A.2d at 1191-92.
66. 84 Md. at 282, 35 A. at 965. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
67. 300 Md. at 73, 475 A.2d at 1191-92.
68. Id., 475 A.2d at 1191. Actually, Jacobs v. Disharoon, 113 Md. 92, 77 A. 253 (1910),
first announced this rule. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
69. 204 Md. 563, 105 A.2d 212 (1954). See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
70. 300 Md. at 74, 475 A.2d at 1191.
71. Id., 475 A.2d at 1192.
72. This rule should not be confused with the doctrine of adverse possession under color
of title. Under this doctrine, if the adverse claimant had "title papers good enough in appear-
ance and ostensible effect to give [him] the right to the bona fide belief [that he] owned the
land," the adverse claimant would take title to the land specified by the deed even if he did not
actually occupy the entire tract. Spicer v. Gore, 219 Md. 469, 476, 150 A.2d 226, 230 (1959).
Arguably, aspects of the Costello rule reach beyond the issues presented in the case and there-
fore are dicta. Nevertheless, principles of judicial economy and clarity in the law suggest that
the validity of the rule will not be questioned on this ground.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In early Maryland jurisprudence, enclosure was an element necessary for
adverse possession. After this requirement was eliminated statutorily, enclo-
sures remained significant in adverse possession cases because their erection
was probative of the adverse claimant's acts of ownership. If not erected by
the adverse claimant, fences delineated the adverse claim if the claimant ac-
tually occupied the area up to the fence. Other visible lines of demarcation,
such as roads or ditches, generally had the same effect. Costello v. Staubitz
synthesized the earlier cases and produced a rule of law that is easy to apply
in all adverse possession cases involving visible lines of demarcation.
Thomas B. Burnside

